Mercer Law Review
Volume 67
Number 2 Articles Edition

Article 8

3-2016

Timber! The SEC Falls Hard as the Georgia District Court in
Timbervest Finds the Appointment of the SEC ALJs "Likely
Unconstitutional"
Moses M. Tincher

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the Securities
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tincher, Moses M. (2016) "Timber! The SEC Falls Hard as the Georgia District Court in Timbervest Finds
the Appointment of the SEC ALJs "Likely Unconstitutional"," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 67 : No. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol67/iss2/8

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Casenote

Timber! The SEC Falls Hard as the Georgia
District Court in Timbervest Finds the
Appointment of the SEC ALJs
"Likely Unconstitutional"'

I.

INTRODUCTION

The higher you go, the harder you fall. This simple, yet powerful,
adage could not be more apt regarding the recent rise and fall in power
of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The
rise began in 2010 when Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),' giving the SEC

t. I would like to express my warmest gratitude to Professor Linda Jellum, who has
an enchanting "tough love" attitude and expertise in administrative law. Without her
continued support and guidance, this Casenote would not have been possible. I also would
like to thank Professor Gary Simson for reviewing this Casenote and offering his superb
advice.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.
tits. 7, 12, 15, 22, and 42).
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new power over its administrative proceedings. 2 Using this new power,
the SEC brought more insider-trading and highly contested cases before
specially hired administrative law judges (ALJs),3 who conduct these
administrative proceedings." This "home-court" advantage corresponded
with the SEC's enforcement division enjoying an 86%, success rate in
administrative proceedings over the past five years, compared to only a
70% success rate in federal courts."
With this increased success, the SEC has faced strong opposition from
various investment advisory groups.' Specifically, these groups have
raised multiple district court challenges to the SEC's hearing process,
including one particularly innovative challenge in Timbervest v. SEC.'
In this 2015 case, the plaintiffs alleged, among other things,' that the
SEC's appointment process for its ALJs is unconstitutional.? Judge May
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
agreed and found that the SEC's appointment of ALJs likely violates
Article II of the United States Constitution,o because ALJs are inferior
officers, not mere employees.
As inferior officers, ALJs must be
appointed by the President, the courts of law, or the heads of departments.1 2 The SEC ALJs are not appointed by any of these parties."

2. Jean Eaglesham, Fairnessof SEC Judges Is in Spotlight, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22,
2015, 9:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fairness-of-sec-judges-is-in-spotlight1448236970.
3. Id.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
5. Fairnessof SEC Judges, supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., Bebo v. SEC, No. 15-1511, 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015); Duka v. SEC, No.
15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124444 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015);
Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082 (N.D. Ga. Aug.
4, 2015); Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-0492-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
131792 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015); Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472 (RA), 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 85015 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015); Hill v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-1801-LMM, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 74822 (N.D. Ga. June 8, 2015).
7. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082.
8. The plaintiffs also alleged that the SEC's ALJ system violated the Removals Clause
of Article II of the Constitution and that the SEC's administrative process did not comport
with due process because the ALJs were biased. Id. at *2, *12. The plaintiffs also asked the
Court to enjoin the SEC's publication of the plaintiffs' initial order, any future SEC order,
and any sanctions, if ordered. Id. at *2.
9. Id. at *2.
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
11. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *35.
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
13.

See Hill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *8-9 (noting that the SEC, through its

Office of Administrative Law Judges, hires the SEC ALJs and that the Office of Personnel
Management, the SEC's chief ALJ, and the agency's human resources staff all consult with
one another during the hiring process).
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Therefore, as one of the first cases with which a federal district court
judge has agreed regarding constitutional challenges to the SEC ALJ
appointment, Timbervest creates significant ramifications for the SEC
and, potentially, all other federal agencies that use ALJs.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Timbervest, LLC (Timbervest) is a registered investment
advisor, managing timberland and other environmental assets for
various investment funds." Timbervest manages three comingled
timberland funds and three commingled environmental funds."
In 2010, the SEC's Division of Enforcement began investigating
Timbervest's policies and methods for measuring timberland properties.
Three years later, the SEC initiated an enforcement action against
Timbervest, serving it with an "Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist
Proceedings."" The SEC alleged that Timbervest violated Sections
206(1)17 and 206(2)8 of the Investment Advisers Act for two reasons:
(1) it failed to disclose fees earned in the sale of two properties; and (2)
it sold one of the properties to a third party and later repurchased the
property through a different Timbervest fund."
After a formal administrative hearing, ALJ Elliot ruled in favor of the
SEC, stating that Timbervest violated §§ 206(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act and that the individual plaintiffs aided and abetted
in causing these violations. Timbervest appealed ALJ Elliot's decision to
the SEC commissioners, arguing that the evidence did not support the
ALJ's findings, and that due to the ALJ's bias in favor of the SEC, the
SEC's administrative forum was unconstitutional.2 0
Shortly before the parties' oral argument, the Wall Street Journal
published an article entitled, "SEC Wins With In-House Judges."' In
this article, a former SEC ALJ, Judge McEwen, described the unfairness

14. The remaining plaintiffs were its officers: Joel Shapiro, CEO; Walter Boden, III,
CIO; Donald Zell, Jr., COO; and Gordon Jones II, President. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 132082, at *2-3.
15. Id. at *3.
16. Id.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1) (2012).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (2012). Under these anti-fraud provisions, the SEC simply
needs to show that an investment adviser acted recklessly or negligently, not that there
was an intent to commit fraud. See 15 U.S.C. H§ 80b-6(1)-(2).
19. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *3.
20. Id. at *11-12.
21. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803.
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inherent in SEC administrative proceedings.22 Judge McEwen alleged
that she felt pressured to rule in favor of the SEC and that Chief Judge
Murray had questioned Judge McEwen's loyalty to the SEC whenever
she ruled in favor of the defendants in previous cases. She also stated
that the SEC instructed her to work under the presumption that the
defendants were guilty until proven innocent. Because these statements
were relevant to its due process claim pending before the SEC commissioners, Timbervest demanded the SEC to produce evidence relating to
Judge McEwen's allegations.
In addition, Timbervest later discovered that the SEC had admitted
its commissioners did not appoint ALJ Elliot. 2 4 Timbervest asked the
SEC to produce information relating to ALJ Elliot's appointment. The
SEC staff produced an affidavit stating that the SEC commissioners did
not appoint ALJ Elliot; rather, the SEC's head ALJ appointed him. On
that same day, the SEC asked ALJ Elliot to file an affidavit to address
the question of whether he experienced any pressure or was biased in
favor of the SEC. Soon after, the SEC's secretary notified Timbervest
that ALJ Elliot refused to submit the affidavit."
Failing to find relief in the administrative forum, Timbervest filed a
motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
on June 12, 2015. Timbervest specifically asked the court to declare the
SEC's appointment and removal process for its ALJs as unconstitutional.26 On August 4, 2015, the court denied Timbervest's motion because
the administrative hearing had already occurred.2 ' Nonetheless, while
the court chose not to address Timbervest's removal claim, it concluded
that Timbervest would have likely prevailed on the merits of the
appointment claim. 28 The court reasoned that the SEC ALJs are
inferior officers, not merely employees; therefore, because it violated the

22. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *12; see also SEC Wins, supra note
21.
23. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *12-13.
24. See Tilton, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *5, *9 (finding that while the SEC
admitted its commissioners did not appoint the ALJs themselves, it prevailed on the
threshold issue that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this
constitutional claim).
25. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *13-14.
26. Timbervest also asked the court to enjoin the SEC from publishing Timbervest's
initial order or any future order, as well as from entering any relief against Timbervest in
the administrative proceeding. Id. at *2. This Note will mainly focus on the appointment
issue, while providing a broader discussion of a potential separation of powers violation in
the implication section.
27. Id. at *14, *38.
28. Id. at *35 & n.10.
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Appointments Clause,29 the SEC ALJs' appointment was likely
unconstitutional."30
Following the district court's decision, the SEC commissioners heard
an interlocutory appeal in the administrative proceeding regarding
whether the SEC ALJs were inferior officers. 3' In a four to one ruling,
the commissioners concluded that the SEC ALJs were mere employees,
not inferior officers.3 2 However, the dissent suggested that the judiciary
should resolve the issue rather than the SEC.33
III.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Role of ALJs

In general, ALJs are selected by federal agencies "as ... necessary" to
conduct administrative proceedings.
While ALJs provide initial
decisions that establish factual findings, ALJs have limited authority to
make final decisions. Moreover, the agency heads supervise ALJs,"
such that they have the authority to reverse ALJs' decisions in full, as
to both fact and law." The agencies, however, must award some
deference to the ALJs' initial decision in administrative appeal."

29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
30. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *34-36. In addition to the
appointment claim, the court addressed a threshold question: whether Congress has
impliedly precluded judicial review altogether. Id. at *20 & n.5. Although this issue is a
crucial threshold issue, it is beyond the scope of this Note. Judge May found there was no
preclusion. Id. at *20. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
as well as the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently held the
opposite. See Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (finding that Congress
intended the statutory scheme to be exclusive); see Bebo, 799 F.3d at 767 (same); see also
Elgin v. Dep't of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2132-33 (2012); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489 (2010); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510
U.S. 200, 207 (1994).
31. In re Timbervest, Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-15519, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 4197, Investment Company Act 1940 Release No. 31830, 2015 SEC LEXIS
3854, at *2 (Sept. 17, 2015) (Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
32. Id. at *121.
33. See id. at *116-17.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 3105.
35. See Kent H. Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REv. 797, 806, 811
(2013).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1)-(2) (2012).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the
agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it
may limit the issues on notice or by rule.").
38. Barnett, supra note 35, at 807.
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If an agency disagrees with the ALJ's initial decision, the agency has
authority to remove that ALJ only for "good cause established and
determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board. . . ."" An example
of what constitutes "good cause" is insubordination; however, the MSPB
has not clearly defined how much insubordination an agency must show
to justify removing an ALJ. 40 This ambiguity of the good cause standard, as well as the ALJs' limited independence in final decision making,
have created concerns with respect to the justice rendered in administrative proceedings.4 1 Because ALJs apply agency regulations and policy,
they cannot be entirely unbiased.4 2 Nonetheless, since the enactment
of the Dodd-Frank Act, ALJs from one agency in particular, the SEC,
have collectively ruled in favor of the SEC, rekindling the impartiality
concern.43
B.

The SEC and the Dodd-FrankAct

The SEC is one of many independent federal agencies that uses ALJs
for its administrative proceedings." The SEC was established through
a series of legislative acts.4 5 Specifically, as a result of the Great
Depression, Congress passed-and President Franklin Roosevelt signed
into law-the Securities Act of 1933,46 which was the first federal law
to regulate the sale of securities to investors.4 ' The following year,
Congress created the SEC, with which corporations registered securities. 4 8 Furthermore, the Securities Act of 1933 required the SEC to

39. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
40. Barnett, supra note 35, at 807-08.
41. Id. at 816.
42. See John L. Gedid, ALJ Ethics: Conundrums, Dilemmas, and Paradoxes, 11
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 33, 38 (2002) ("ALJs are not impartial and neutral in the same sense
as Article III judges, but frequently have a role in developing and applying agency policy."
(footnote omitted)).
43. See Fairness of SEC Judges, supra note 2 (the chart displays the SEC ALJs'
decisions over the past five years: the SEC ALJs have ruled in favor of the SEC eightythree times in ninety-six cases).
44. See generally Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1249 (1994) ("The post-New Deal Supreme Court has never seriously
questioned the constitutionality of this combination of functions in agencies.").
45. Id.
46. 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (2012)).
47. DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES xi (2011).
48. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78a-78pp
(2012)).

2016]

TIMBERVEST V. SEC

465

approve an issuer's "registration statement" before the securities could
be sold to investors.
Although this system prevented the most egregious abuses, a number
of investment banking and securities management groups were able to
defraud their investors." A number of high profile securities fraud
cases, along with the financial crisis of 2008, transformed the political
landscape, compelling Congress to enact new legislation.5 ' In 2010,
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which limited the risk of financial
as well as securities fraud,52 while significantly expanding the SEC's
powers.53

Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC could bring claims against
persons or entities registered with the SEC in administrative proceedings." However, for those persons and entities that were unregistered,
the SEC had to file its claims in federal court."5 Pursuant to the DoddFrank Act, the SEC can now use the administrative process to impose
fines and penalties on any person or entity-both those registered and
unregistered with the SEC.5 6 In short, the Dodd-Frank Act significantly
expanded the SEC's ability to proceed administratively. 7 Plaintiffs
responded to this expansion by challenging aspects of the SEC's
administrative process, including whether the SEC's appointment and
removal procedures are constitutional.58

SKEEL, supra note 47.
50. Steven L. Jones, Casenote, Custodial Collies of Transparency-The Competitive
Advantage of ProtectingInvesting Lamm[bs] from Advising Wolves: Lamm v. State Street
Bank & Trust, 66 MERCER L. REV. 1119, 1119 (2015) (noting that investment advisers
defrauding their clients has become increasingly prevalent in our society); see Roger
Wohlner, Beware of FinancialFraud, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 24, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://money.
usnews.com/money/blogs/the-smarter-mutual-fund-investor/2013/04/24/beware-of-financialfraud.
51. See SKEEL, supra note 47, at 4.
52. Id.
53. Hill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *4.
54. Id.; see Gupta v. SEC., 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
55. Hill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *4; see Duka, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124444,
at *30.
56. Hill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *4. The SEC may bring enforcement actions
under Section 206 against advisers who are unregistered by virtue of Section 203(b)(3). See
15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2012).
57. See Hill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *4.
58. See id. at *13. Another major legal challenge is whether the SEC can function as
both an enforcer and adjudicator of the law while simultaneously complying with due
process and fairness in its internal proceedings. See id.
49.
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C.

Appointments Clause
The Appointments Clause governs the appointment of all "officers of
the United States."" These officers exercise "significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States" 60 and fall into one of two
categories: principal and inferior officers.61 While principal officers must
be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,
inferior officers may be appointed in one of four ways: (1) in the same
manner as principal officers, (2) by the President alone, (3) by the courts
of law, or (4) by the heads of departments.62 The framers specified
these detailed procedures for appointment6 3 because of their fear and
skepticism of anyone who could be appointed to federal office. 64 In the
appointment of principal officers, the framers sought to establish
accountability and a decentralization of power by giving one constitutional actor the power to act while giving another the ability to check that
power in certain ways.65 Additionally, regarding the inferior officer
provision, the framers sought to enhance the efficiency of the appointment process. 66 Because often the Senate does not acquiesce so willingly to a presidential nomination," the framers allowed inferior officers

59. Id.; United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1879).
60. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
61. Germaine, 99 U.S. at 509 ("The Constitution for purposes of appointment very
clearly divides all its officers into two classes [namely, 'principal' and 'inferior' officers].")
(quoted in Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 183 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring)
(referring to officers as "principal and inferior officers")).
62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The inferior officer provision is also sometimes
referred to as the "Excepting Clause," which gives Congress flexibility in the appointing
of inferior officers. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997).
63.
See generally John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of
Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1737 (2004) ("[Wlhen an adopted text
establishes a new power and takes care to specify the mode of its exercise, our tradition
is to treat such a specification as presumptively exclusive. Otherwise, why would a
lawmaking body take the trouble to spell out often elaborate procedures for exercising a
grant of power if alternative procedures would do just as well?" (footnotes omitted)).
64. See CongressionalRestrictionson the President'sAppointment Power and the Role
of Longstanding Practice in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1914, 1917
(2007).
65. See id.; Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory
Qualifications for Federal Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 751 (2008) (discussing
Congressional intent in drafting the Appointments Clause).
66. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660 ("As one of our early opinions suggests, [the Excepting
Clause's] obvious purpose is administrative convenience. . . .").
67. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understandingof the Federal
Appointments Process, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 467, 487 (1998) (noting an emerging
trend where the Senate has increasingly interfered with presidential nominations, delaying

2016]

TIMBERVEST V. SEC

467

to not only be appointed in the same way as principal officers but also
in three alternative ways.
D.

PrincipalOfficers vs. Inferior Officers

To interpret the Appointments Clause properly, a judge must
distinguish between principal officers, inferior officers, and employees.
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has not provided a
clear test to distinguish these three." Instead, the Court developed two
tests, one from Morrison v. Olson"o and the other from Edmond v.
United States,n to help courts differentiate between principal and
inferior officers.7 2 While these two cases focused on the distinction
between principal and inferior officers, later courts have used these tests
to differentiate between inferior officers and employees as well. Hence,
this section will start with Morrison and Olson for differentiating
principal and inferior officers. The next section will explain how those
tests were expanded to differentiate inferior officers from employees.
1. The Morrison Test. In Morrison, an appointed independent
counsel (Morrison) investigated an official of the Attorney General's
Office (Olson) for a potential federal law violation. At Morrison's request,
a grand jury issued and served a subpoena on Olson. In response, Olson
moved to quash the subpoena arguing, among other things, that
Morrison was unconstitutionally appointed." The relevant act74
provided that independent counsels were to be appointed by a court of
law, rather than by the president with the advice and consent of the

the appointments process).
68. See id.
69. See Nick Bravin, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court's New
Appointments Clause Jurisprudence,98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1114 (1998) ("Early Supreme
Court attempts to define the term 'officer' provide inexact, if any, judicially manageable
standards."); Edward Susolik, SeparationofPowers and Liberty: The Appointments Clause,
Morrison v. Olson, and Rule of Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1545 (1990) ("[A] definitive
understanding of the term 'officer' is not forthcoming for two simple reasons: (1) there are
too few cases for any consistent precedential principle to be articulated, and (2) the few
cases that do exist posit conclusions rather than arguments and provide little insight to
justify their results.").
70. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
71. 520 U.S. 651.
72. Id. at 663; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-71.
73. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 668-69.
74. Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (2012).
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Senate." The key issue before the Supreme Court, therefore, was
whether independent counsels were principal or inferior officers.
Holding that the act's appointment process was constitutional, the
Court held that independent counsels are "clearly" inferior officers.
The Court identified four factors to support its finding: an individual is
an inferior officer when (1) a superior executive branch official has the
authority to remove the officer; (2) the officer's significant duties are
limited; (3) the officer has a limited jurisdiction; and (4) the officer has
a limited tenure.
Justice Scalia dissented.7 ' He began by criticizing the majority's
application of the four factors."o He then put forward a new test to
distinguish between principal and inferior officers.8 ' Unlike the
majority, Justice Scalia maintained that a single-factor test should be
used to determine whether independent counsels are inferior officers.8
This single factor is whether independent counsels are subordinate to a
principal officer. 3 According to Justice Scalia, though "not a sufficient
condition for 'inferior' officer status," this subordinate relationship is "a
necessary condition."" Applying his single-factor test, Justice Scalia
reasoned that because the Attorney General could remove independent
counsels only for cause, they were not inferior officers." This dissent
took on special importance when Justice Scalia wrote the majority
opinion in a later case that addressed this issue, Edmond. 6
2. The Edmond Test. In Edmond, a court-martial tribunal
convicted petitioners of a criminal act. The judges from the Coast Guard
Court of Criminal Appeals (CGCCA), whom the Secretary of Transportation appointed, confirmed the petitioners' convictions."7 The petitioners

75. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72.
76. Id. at 670-71.
77. See id. at 671.
78. Id. at 671-72.
79. Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 715-16.
81. See id. at 719-21.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 722 (alterations in original).
85. Id. at 722-23.
86. Edmond, 520 U.S. 652. The Court applied Scalia's "subordinate relationship" test
in finding the ALJs as inferior officers. Id. at 661. Military judges were also found to be
inferior officers in Weiss because of their subordinate relationship to the Secretary, a
principal officer. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 172.
87. Edmond. 520 U.S. at 653.
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argued that, under the relevant statute," the Secretary lacked the
authority to appoint CGCCA judges. The petitioners also argued that
because these judges were principal officers, only the President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, could appoint them. Thus, the central
issue for the Supreme Court was whether the Secretary's appointment
of CGCCA judges violated the Appointments Clause."
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion and the Court held that the
judges' appointments did not violate the Appointments Clause." With
the freedom to apply the test he had created in his dissent in Morrison,"' Justice Scalia explained that the Morrison majority's multifactor
test was not "definitive" as to whether an officer is inferior rather than
principal.9 2 Instead, he reasoned that "'inferior officers' are officers
whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were
appointed [as principal officers]."" Applying this test to CGCCA judges,
Justice Scalia noted that CGCCA judges were inferior officers because
the Judge Advocate General of the Coast Guard and the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces jointly exercised enough supervision over
them.94 In particular, Justice Scalia described how the Judge Advocate
General could remove these judges without cause and how the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces must review any and all decisions that
these judges made. Justice Scalia strongly emphasized this last factor,
explaining that because CGCCA judges have "no power to render a final
decision unless permitted to do so by other executive officers," they were
inferior officers.9 6
E.

Inferior Officers vs. Employees

Morrison and Edmond each provided a test that differentiates
principal officers from inferior officers." While incorporating those

88. 49 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2012).
89. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 653.
90. Id. at 653, 666.
91. Justice Scalia now had this "freedom" because the majority of the Court, with some
changes in court personnel (whereby Justice Breyer, Ginsburg, Thomas, and Souter
succeeded Justice Blackmun, White, Marshall, and Brennan, respectively) switched their
views from Morrison. See id. at 652.
92. Id. at 661.
93. Id. at 663.
94. See id. at 664.
95. Id. at 664, 664-65.
96. Id. at 665.
97. See Andrew Croner, Essay, Morrison, Edmond, and the Power ofAppointments, 77
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1002, 1011 (2007) ("As a result of the Morrisonand Edmond decisions,
the Court has left us with two conflicting methods of determining whether an officer is
principal or inferior, both of which are still technically good law.").
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tests, the next section explains the jurisprudence distinguishing inferior
officers from employees."
1. The Freytag Approach. The most important Supreme Court case
to address this issue is Freytag v. Commissioner." In that case, the
petitioners were taxpayers who allegedly owed tax deficiencies for
deducting losses realized in a tax shelter scheme.o Pursuant to the
relevant code,1 o' the Chief Judge of the Tax Court assigned a special
trial judge (STJ) to hear the petitioners' cases. The petitioners argued
that because the STJ presiding over their case was an inferior officer, his
appointment pursuant to the code violated the Appointments Clause.
However, the petitioners acknowledged that if the STJ was a mere
employee, no constitutional violation would exist. Therefore, the relevant
issue for the Supreme Court was whether the STJs were inferior officers
or mere employees, which the Court defined as "lesser functionar"102
ies.
To resolve this issue, the Court examined whether the degree of
authority that the STJs exercised was "so significant" that the STJs
should be characterized as more than mere employees. 0 3 In particular,
the Court considered the significance of the duties and discretion that
the STJs possess, both of which are "specified by statute."'0 4 In doing
so, the Court examined a factor from the Morrison test: the scope of the
officer's duties.1o' Because the STJs perform important functions, such
as taking testimony and conducting trials, the Court held that the STJs
exercised significant-enough discretion to make them inferior officers
rather than mere employees.0 6 Although Edmond had not yet been
decided, the Court foreshadowed the Edmond test: because the STJs can

98. See, e.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 886 (1991); Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d
1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000). For a thorough discussion of the distinction between officers and
employees, please see Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the
Appointments Clause, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/olc/opinions/2007/04/31/appointmentsclausevlO.pdf.
99. 501 U.S. 886 (1991).
100. Id. at 871.
101. I.R.C. § 7443A(b) (2006).
102. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162. Moreover, the
Court noted that because inferior officers exercise "significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the United States," by deduction, inferior officers rank higher than employees. See
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
103. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162.
104. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
105. See id. at 881; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72.
106. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881-82.
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make final decisions in limited circumstances where the Chief Judge
grants them such power, the STJs are inferior officers.o7 The Court,
thus, rejected the argument that the STJs could be inferior officers in
some situations and mere employees in others.' Finally, in dicta, the
Court explained that its conclusion that the STJs were inferior officers
"would be unchanged," considering only the STJs' limited, final decisionmaking authority.'0 9
2. The Landry Approach. In contrast, in Landry v. FederalDeposit
Insurance Corp.,"o the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reached a different conclusion from Freytag by
latching onto dicta in Freytag."' In Landry, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) sought to bring a prohibition order
against the petitioner for his misconduct while managing a local
bank.'1 2 Pursuant to the relevant act, "3 the FDIC assigned the case
to an ALJ for a formal administrative hearing. After a two-week hearing,
the FDIC ALJ issued a decision recommending that the FDIC issue the
proposed prohibition order. The petitioner appealed the decision, arguing
that the FDIC ALJs appointment violated the Appointments Clause
because the FDIC ALJs were inferior officers, and they were not
appointed by the President, a court of law, or head of department." 4
Finding no constitutional violation, the Landry court held that the FDIC
ALJs were mere employees, not inferior officers."'
In its reasoning, the court compared the powers of the FDIC ALJs
with the powers of the STJs in Freytag."6 Like the STJs, the FDIC
ALJs' office is "established by Law" and the ALJs' duties for the office
are "specified by statute.""' Moreover, the FDIC ALJs similarly "take
testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have
the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders.""s However, in

107. See id. at 882 (these limited circumstances include declaratory judgment
proceedings and certain small-amount tax cases); Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665 (officials are
inferior officers when they lack the authority to make final decisions "unless permitted to
do so by other executive officers"-in Freytag, the Chief Judge is an executive officer).
108. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882.
109. Id.
110. Landry, 204 F.3d 1125.
111. Id. at 1134.
112. Id. at 1128.
113. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2012).
114. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1128.
115. Id. at 1134.
116. Id. at 1133.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1133-34 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881-82).
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distinguishing the FDIC ALJs from the STJs, the court focused on the
respective final decision-making authority.1 ' The court noted that the
opinion in Freytag had strongly emphasized the STJs' final decisionmaking authority; therefore, the Landry court reasoned that final
decision-making authority played a crucial role in the Freytag Court's
decision. 1 2 0 Furthermore, because Edmond had now been decided, the
court held that the FDIC ALJs were not inferior officers because they
lack the power to make a final decision.1 2 ' In sum, the court narrowly
applied dicta from Freytag and the newly created Edmond test: because
the FDIC ALJs were not "permitted to [render a final decision] by other
Executive officers," they were mere employees and not inferior officers. 1 22
Judge Randolph concurred in part.' In his concurring opinion, he
offered two criticisms of the majority's finding that the FDIC ALJs were
employees.1 24 First, Judge Randolph argued that the majority misapplied the test from Edmond.'2 1 Quoting the test, he explained that the
very fact that ALJs lack the power to render a final decision and are
subject to the FDIC's supervision demonstrates their "characteristic of
an 'inferior Officer.'"1 26 Second, while admitting that the FDIC ALJs
can never render final decisions, whereas the STJs could under limited
circumstances, Judge Randolph suggested that this distinction was
insignificant because the Court in Freytag had "clearly designated [the
STJ's authority of final decision-making] as an alternative holding."1 2 7
Thus, he concluded that the FDIC ALJs were inferior officers.' 28
F

Are SEC ALJs Inferior Officers?

Neither Freytag nor Landry ended the debate on the inferior officer
issue-an issue that has recently caught the attention of the Supreme
Court.'2 9 As for the SEC ALJs, a couple of district courts have ad-

119. Id. at 1134.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665.
123. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1140 (Randolph, J., concurring in part) (agreeing with the
majority's judgment of sustaining the FDIC's decision and order because the petitioner had
suffered no prejudicial error).
124. Id. at 1143.
125. See id. at 1141-42.
126. Id. at 1142.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1143.
129. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 507 n.10 (Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged
the issue of whether the SEC ALJs are inferior officers but left the question open to
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dressed whether the SEC ALJs are inferior officers and whether their
appointment violates the Appointments Clause."'o The northern
district court in Georgia is one such court."a1
IV.

COURT's RATIONALE

In 7imbervest, Judge May of the northern district court in Georgia
found that the SEC ALJs were likely inferior officers, and thus, their
appointment as an SEC ALJ was likely unconstitutional. 3 2 Despite
finding that plaintiff Timbervest had a likelihood of success on the
merits of its Appointments Clause claim, the court denied Timbervest's
request for a preliminary injunction because Timbervest's initial
administrative hearing had already taken place. 3 3 Additionally, while
Timbervest also raised a removal claim, the court maintained that there
was likely no violation of separation of powers.' 34
In the district court proceeding, the court first found that the SEC
ALJs were not mere employees pursuant to Freytag.as The court
indicated that the most important factor for determining inferior officer
status, which comes from the multifactor test in Morrison,1 3 6 is
whether "the SEC ALJs exercise 'significant authority.""" In doing so,
the court specifically rejected the majority's reasoning in Landry3 8

debate).
130. See generally Duka, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106605 (holding that the SEC ALJs
are inferior officers); Gray, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792 (same); Hill, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 74822 (same).
131. See generally Gray, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792; Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 132082; Hill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822.
132. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *35.
133. Id. at *38. However, in two companion cases, Gray and Hill, the court enjoined the
administrative proceedings pending in those cases because the respective plaintiffs did
satisfy all factors for a preliminary injunction and no administrative hearing had yet been
filed. Gray, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792, at *3; Hill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *1.
Moreover, the court in Timbervest determined it could not prevent a future harm by
removing the ALJ's initial decision because the decision was available since August 2014
and was likely published on various websites. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082,
at *35-37. The court also concluded that it could not prevent any future harm resulting
from the initial judgment because any future harm incurred by Timbervest would be mere
speculation. Id.
134. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *35 n.10. The determination that
ALJs are inferior officers is also fundamental to the removal issue; hence, this Note
discusses that issue as well.
135. Id. at *26; see also Freytag, 510 U.S. at 881-82.
136. 487 U.S. 654.
137. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *31.
138. 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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that final decision-making authority was the most important factor."'9
While the Court in Edmond"'o had held that final decision-making
authority was important to distinguish between principal and inferior
officers, the Timbervest court reasoned that this distinction was not
relevant to distinguish between inferior officers and mere employees. 4
In sum, the court synthesized Morrison, Edmond, Freytag, and Landry
to create a test that identifies the differences between inferior officers
and mere employees.142
Second, while acknowledging that the SEC ALJs cannot issue certain
injunctive relief, the court stated this was insignificant because the SEC
commissioners, who are indisputably officers of the United States, also
cannot issue injunctive relief on their own.14 3 Lastly, while Congress
classified the SEC ALJs as civil servants, the court explained that giving
Congress the power to decide whether an ALJ is an employee or inferior
officer would "defeat the separation-of-powers protections the [Appointments] Clause was enacted to protect."1 44
Because the court concluded that the SEC ALJs were likely inferior
officers, the court next addressed whether their appointment was
constitutional. 1 45 While the SEC commissioners jointly constitute the
"Head of the Department" for appointment purposes,1 4 6 the SEC had
already conceded it did not appoint its ALJs.' Therefore, because
neither the head of a department, the President, nor the courts of law
appoint the SEC ALJs, the court found that SEC ALJ appointment
process was likely unconstitutional.14
V.

IMPLICATIONS

By invalidating the SEC ALJ appointment process, 'Tmbervest will
likely impact not only the SEC but all federal agencies that use ALJs.
Currently, there are approximately 1584 ALJs working for twenty-eight

139. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *29.
140. 520 U.S. at 651.
141. See Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *31-32 (finding that the SEC
ALJs' lack of final decision-making authority is only an additional reason, not the reason
for why they are inferior officers).
142. See id. at *26-32.
143. Id. at *32.
144. Id. at *33. The court did not accept the overgeneralization that Congress intended
all officers within the competitive civil service listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2102 to be employees.
See 5 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012).
145. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *34.
146. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 511-12.
147. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *35.
148. Id.
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federal agencies. 49 Given those numbers, it is not hard to imagine the
angst 'Tmbervest may spark. While far from uniform, the ALJ appointment process in federal agencies likely mirrors that of the SEC.
Consequently, courts may soon find the appointment process for many
ALJs unconstitutional. In addition, while the agencies bring their
appointment processes into compliance with the Constitution, thousands
of administrative cases might shift to federal courts, potentially
burdening these tribunals."'o
At least for the SEC, there may be an easy fix. In a companion case
to Timbervest, Judge May suggested an "easy cure" to this constitutional
infirmity.'' The SEC commissioners need only appoint ALJs directly.' 52 However, while this cure may seem, on its face, easy, when given
the opportunity to appoint ALJs directly, the SEC commissioners flatly
refused to do so."' By refusing this option, the SEC commissioners
adamantly argued that their SEC ALJs were mere employees and, thus,
no cure was necessary. Likely, the SEC commissioners do not want to
deal with the consequences of admitting that their appointment process
was unconstitutional, because if true, then the validity of hundreds of
administrative opinions might be at risk. Indeed, the Supreme Court in
National Labor Relations Board v. Canning54 recently alluded to this

149. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 586 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150. Particularly, future cases against the SEC will likely be assigned to Judge May
of the Northern District of Georgia after the recent court decision in Ironridge v. SEC. See
Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2512-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156925,
at *39 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 2015) (finding that any action against the SEC has proper venue
because " 1391(c) applies to the SEC as [] 'an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued
in its common name under applicable law' and sets the SEC's residency 'in any judicial
district in which [it] is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction ... " (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c) (2012)) (second bracket and ellipsis in original)).
151. See Hill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *54 (finding that the ALJ's appointment
could easily be cured by having the SEC commissioners issue an appointment or preside
over the matter themselves).
152. Other agencies could do the same. Because most agencies, like the SEC, are
considered "Departments," their ALJ appointments would certainly satisfy the Appointments Clause. See Barnett, supra note 36, at 810 (because not all agencies are departments, the ALJs that are selected by a non-department agency "are not properly appointed
under the Appointments Clause"). Moreover, there are some agencies within agencies, such
as the Department Review Board within the Department of Labor, that would need to have
the controlling agency appoint the ALJs.
153. Duka, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124444, at *65. A judge granted the SEC seven days
to notify the court of its intention to cure any violation of the Appointments Clause.
Arguing there was no violation, the SEC submitted a letter to the court refusing to cure.

Id.
154.

134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
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outcome."' In Canning, the Court held that President Obama improperly appointed three commissioners to the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) as recess appointments. 56 Importantly, after reaching
this result, the Court vacated every case that the three unconstitutionally appointed NLRB commissioners had decided.15 7 Thus, if the SEC
adopts the "easy cure," hundreds of cases may, as a consequence, be
thrown out. And, this same scenario could play out across many other
agencies.
To counter this possible drawback, the SEC would likely respond as
follows. First, in the Canningcase, while the Court vacated all decisions
from the three unconstitutionally appointed commissioners, it also
refused to "render illegitimate thousands of recess appointments
reaching all the way back to the founding era.""5 Thus, pragmatically,
the SEC may argue that reopening too many of the previously decided
hearings would be costly and unduly burdensome. Second, the SEC could
claim protection under the de facto doctrine. Under this doctrine, even
if the legality of an ALJ's appointment to office is later discovered
unconstitutional, so long as the officer acted under the color of official
title, the decisions are valid.' Lastly, the SEC could argue that any
error was harmless error-no harm, no foul.1 60 Agencies have de novo

review of ALJ decisions."' In effect, the SEC commissioners serve as
a second pair of eyes to ensure accuracy and fairness. Arguably, the de
novo review would cure any potential harm.
Meanwhile, for those opposed to federal agencies having broad powers,
this "easy cure" may not be ideal, but for different reasons. Prior to
Timbervest, some ALJs indicated that their agencies interfered with
their decisions, even to the extent of pressuring ALJs to rule different-

155. See id. at 2557.
156. Id. at 2576-77.

157. Id. at 2577.
158. Id.
159. Norton v. Shelby Cnty., 118 U.S. 425,440 (1886); see 63C AM. JUR. 2D, Prohibition
to Public Officers and Employees § 23(2009) ("The concept of 'de facto' officer is utilized to
give legal effect to public acts done under the color of law by persons not officers de jure.
The de facto officer doctrine was engrafted upon the law as a matter of policy and necessity
to protect the interests of the public and individuals involved in the official acts of persons
exercising the duty of an officer without actually being one in strict point of law." (footnotes
omitted)).
160. The federal "harmless error" statute provides that "the court shall give judgment
after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2012).
161. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
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ly.16 2 ALJ independence is essential for fair process. If agency heads

are required to appoint ALJs directly, then they will likely select the
ALJs whom they believe will be most sympathetic to the agency
positions. 1 63 While agencies may argue that their ALJs still have
significant independence, because the Office of Personnel Management
limits agency discretion in selecting ALJ candidates, this selection
process cannot ensure independence." Therefore, this "easy cure"
threatens ALJs' independence and impartiality.'
Timbervest also involved another issue: whether the SEC ALJ removal
process violates separation of powers, because ALJs are subject to
multiple layers of for-cause removal.' The Timbervest court noted
that it had "serious doubts" of a separation of powers violation.6 7
Regardless of the court's doubt, if the SEC ALJ removal protections are
unconstitutional, the entire administrative state may have to be
reconfigured. The SEC ALJs, and potentially all ALJs, are currently
subject to the multiple for-cause removal process' 6 8 and, unlike the
appointment issue, there is no easy cure. In Free Enterprise Fund v.

162. Charles H. Koch, Jr., AdministrativePresidingOfficials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. REV.
271, 280 (1994); see Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence
and the Value of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 477 (1986) ("[If the adjudicator
is himself an integral part of the governmental body on the other side of the case, then it
is likely that his decision will be based on considerations other than the merits as
developed by the evidence"); Eaglesham, supra note 21.
163. See Barnett, supra note 35, at 820-21 (noting that one part of the ALJ quandary
is federal agencies benefitting from their "impartial" ALJs).
164. Id. at 819.
165. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrarinessand Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 472 (2003).
166. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 486 ("The Act places the Board under the SEC's
oversight.... But the individual members of the Board . . . are substantially insulated
from the Commission's control. The Commission cannot remove Board members at will, but
only for good cause shown, in accordance with certain procedures." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
167. Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *35 n.10 (finding that because the
SEC ALJs hold "quasi-judicial" or "adjudicatory" positions, their removal protections do not
interfere with the president's ability to exercise his removal power).
168. Presumably, there are three levels of for-cause removal protection for the SEC
ALJs. First, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) establishes that all federal
agencies may remove their ALJs only for good cause. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a). Second, the
Supreme Court has simply assumed that the President may remove SEC commissioners
only for good cause. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 479. Third, the members of the MSPB
may also only be removed by the president for cause. 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d). In sum, if the
president ever wants to remove an ALJ, he must clear the "for-cause hurdle" afforded to
the MSPB members, then clear the hurdle afforded to the SEC Commissioners, and then
finally clear the hurdle afforded to that ALJ.
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Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,6 9 the Supreme Court severed
the removal provision at issue.1 70 Here, such a solution is unavailable
for two reasons. First, because ALJs have multiple layers of removal, so
even if the SEC can remove their ALJs at-will, dual for-cause removal
remains."' Additionally, and perhaps more critically, if agencies have
greater control over their ALJs' removal, the ALJs' independence would
be lost altogether. As noted earlier, some ALJs have already expressed
concerns about this issue."' Making ALJs removable at-will simply
exacerbates that problem.17' Thus, if there is a constitutional infirmity,
it is not easily cured.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The issues in Timbervest are some of the most important issues to be
decided in securities law in decades. Timbervest challenges the
constitutionality of the entire federal ALJ system, disputing both ALJ
appointments and removals. While it is not clear whether the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit will uphold the district
court's decision that the SEC ALJs are inferior officers,"' one thing is
for certain: if the Timbervest approach carries the day, the SEC's
gradual rise in power may soon experience an abrupt decline. But it is
not just the SEC that will fall. Admittedly, the SEC can readily fix the
appointment issue for its ALJs; however, the removal issue will be much
more difficult to fix. Indeed, it will take an act of Congress to change the
current removal process."' And the SEC is just the tip of the iceberg.

169. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
170. Id. at 514; see id. at 495 (holding that the SEC can now remove PCAOB members
at will so that the president "could then hold the Commission to account for its supervision
of the Board").
171. Dual for-cause removal still remains because the president cannot remove an AJ
unless the MSPB members find sufficient good cause to remove the ALJ; if the president
and the MSPB members disagree whether an ALJ should be removed, the president cannot
remove these members without establishing good cause.
172. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 162.
173. See id. at 499 ("Evidence suggests that various agencies have used the possibility
of removal as a tool for coercing decisions that are consistent with the agency's wishes.").
174. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit heard oral arguments
from counsel for the SEC and counsel for the plaintiffs in Hill and Gray, respectively, on
February 24, 2016. Depending on if there is a circuit split between the Eleventh Circuit
and the Second Circuit (Tilton and Duka), the United States Supreme Court may rule on
these SEC ALJ cases.
175. Soon agencies may remove ALJs only for good cause. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a). The
majority in Free Enter. Fund held that the dual "for-cause" removal protection is
unconstitutional, because it impermissibly hinders the president's oversight of the agency.
561 U.S. at 484.
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These challenges apply with equal force to every administrative agency
using ALJs. In short, what may have seemed like a pesky annoyance to
the SEC has the potential to disrupt the entire administrative state.
MOSES M. TINCHER

